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The top leadership of the Soviet Union is in a rare state of flux, with 
major implications for the United States. Yuriy Andropov has rapidly 
ascenCad to the chairmanship of the Communist Party and the Presidency, but 
his age, poor health, and l.ong absences from public view raise questions over 
how securely and for how long he may hold power. 
The United States faces the challenge of trying, despite Moscow's veil of 
secrecy, to interpret and understand the new people and policies brought by 
the transition. There is still no clear sense in Washington of whether and 
how the United States-can deal with the new leadership or with whom precisely 
one should be trying to deal. Is the Soviet military in a position of 
growing influence? If so, what does this imply for U.S. global interests, 
the military balance, and arms control? Is the Soviet Union prepared to 
introduce economic reforms that might redirect efforts away from aggressive 
competition with the United States? Can .. the United States influence t'he 
direction the Soviets take? 
BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS 
THE NEW SOVIET LEADERSHIP Andropov's rise coincides with the beginnings of a 
wholesale turnover at the top of the Soviet hierarchy. The new people 
brought in to fill existing vacancies at the top can set the course of Soviet 
policy for years to come. 
Recent appointments suggest that the group around Andropov is 
consolidating its political strength. But Yuriy Andropov faces severe 
constraints, not the least of which are his age and health. But his program 
could also falter due to resistance from the entrenched bureaucracy, the 
magnitude of the problems faced by the Soviet Union, and competing pressures 
for scarce resources. Even his colleagues who acknowledge the need for 
change in principle may be less supportive if new policies begin to threaten 
their own positions or special interests. 
Changes have been modest thus far, but new policies are promised. Any 
major changes in the direction of Soviet domestic or foreign policy at a time 
of heightened U.S.-Soviet tensions will be of major significance to the 
United States. (For more extensive treatment of issues in U.S.-Soviet 
relations, including the bilateral arms control negotiations, see IB83066, 
U.S.-Soviet Relations.) 
The'new Sovie Soviet leadership includes many men who were prominent under 
Brezhnev though the constellation of p0we.r within the leadership has changed. 
Yuriy Andropov 
Yuriy Andropov has emerged as the most powerful Soviet figure, though his 
poor health casts some doubt on his position His selection to the leadership 
was not wholly unexpected but the absence of visible contention and the speed 
with which he initially asserted his primacy Was a surprise to* most Western 
analysts. Despite his early show of strength, it may take years for him or 
anyone else to fully consolidate his power. In the meantime, no 'Soviet 
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leader likely to have complete freedom to do what he wants. 
Who is Yuriy Andropov? He has been described in the West as everything 
from a Western-oriented closet liberal at one extreme to a ruthless and 
cunning KGB secret policeman at the other. There is very little evidence for 
assuming the first, and the latter description does not adequately reflect 
his complex background. In truth, Westerners have very little firsthand 
knowledge of the man. Despite his extensive foreign policy experience, 
Andropov has not travelled outside the Soviet bloc, with the exception of a 
few trips to Yugoslavia, or held formal positions dealing with non-Communist 
countries. He met very rarely with Westerners prior to becoming the Party 
leader. 
Some inferences about Andropov can be drawn from his past experiences: 
(1) He is first and foremost a loyal Party man. It was through the 
Communist Party hierarchy that he rose to a position of prominence. What 
little formal higher education he had was primarily through the Party 
schools. Virtually everything he has achieved he owes to Party policy. The 
platform from which he was able to finally ascend to the Soviet leadership 
was his dual membership in the Politburo (since 1973) and Secretariat 
(returned in 1982). So Andropov does not come to the Party leadership as an 
outsider. Nor does he seem to represent a long-standing, anti-Brezhnev 
faction. He rose to the top as a Brezhnev protege. 
(2) Most of Andropov's career has been spent in the Soviet national 
security sphere, broadly defined. While he has had no high-level military 
background as such, his Party, Foreign Ministry, and KGB experiences have 
been concentrated in this area. He gravitated to this sensitive work at an 
early age. His first major Party positions were in the strategic and 
inhospitable border regions of the Karelo-Finnish Republic during and after 
World war 11. His subsequent foreign policy experience was focused 
exclusively on the strategically vital Soviet periphery. His work involved 
relations with the Socialist countries. He was Ambassador to Hungary from 
1954 to 1957. As such, he was the senior Soviet official in Budapest when 
Soviet forces moved to crush the revolution in 1956. Andropov's role in the 
events of 1956 and Hungary's subsequent evolution have been subject to 
different interpretations. But his performance in Hungary must have met with 
the approval of his superiors as he was selected to direct the Party Central 
Committee's department in charge of relations with the So<ialist countries. 
He continued those responsibilities until he became the head of the KGB in 
1967. With that appointment, Andropov gained Control not Only of world-wide 
Soviet intelligence operations but also of the massive "second. army" of 
secret police, internal security forces, and border guards. 
(3) The KGB may have become Andropov's primary institutional base in 
recent years. He headed the or.ganization from 1967 to 1982. While Andropov 
did not rise through the KGB ranks but was placed in charge of that 
organization from outside by the Farty, his 15 years in the organizaticn and 
his influence in reshaping it provided a very strong bond. As its chairman, 
, he molded the KGB into a far more effective and powerful .organization than 
the one he inherited. Its methods became more subtle, sophisticated and 
varied. Its staff is more highly trained and professional. Yet the KG9 
acted ruthlessly unde-r Andropov tc destroy the Soviet clissident movement at 
home and Vigorously expanded its intelligence operations abroad. Andropov's 
KGB chairmanship presumably gave him unequaled access to information on both 
ihe Soviet and internationai situations. 
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His background and personal traits in the end proved to be the right 
combination to allow him to succeed Brezhnev. His reputation as tough and 
smart may have seemed the best antidote to the feeling of stagnation and' 
drift pervading the Soviet Union. The Soviet elite may have seen in him a 
stronger and more decisive leader than Brezhnev was in his 1.ater years. The 
general impression of Western analysts is that Andropov is intelligent and 
knowledgeable despite his lack of a formal education. ~ h o u g h  an 
ideologically committed Marxist-Leninist, he has been described as less 
dogmatic, more flexible and pragmatic than many of his rivals. Foreigners 
who have met with him since he assumed office have found his confident, 
blunt, and direct' style refreshing. Whether he is a reformer, too, remains 
to be seen. In terms of pre-succession rhetoric, he was not the leading 
advocate of reform among the contenders for power. That role was played by 
Chernenko. 
Andropov had to overcome several handicaps to win the leadership. Those 
handicaps included: (1) lack of recent experience in Party administration, 
(2) virtually no background in economic policy, (3) fears evoked by his 
association with the KGB, and (4) the fact that he was not apparently 
Brezhnev's first choice as successor. Andropov may have won because no 
obvious contender was without weaknesses and because he had the support of 
the decisive group in the Politburo and Secretariat, including key 
representatives of the military, foreign policy, and security establishment. 
Other Leadership Changes 
A number of top level positions in the Party became vacant immediately 
before or since Andropov assumed power. With Suslov's, Pelshe's, and 
Brezhnev's deaths, as well as Kirilenko's retirement, four major new 
vacancies were created in the Politburo, and three in the Secretariat, to go 
with earlier ones that had not been filled. The first promotions to the top 
Party bodies were that of Grigoriy Romanov to the Secretariat, Geydar Aliyev 
from candidate to full member of the Politburo, as well as to the Council of 
Ministers, and Nikolay Ryzhkov to the Secretariat. Vitaliy Vorontnikov was 
named a candidate member of the Politburo. Aliyev made his career in the KGB 
and internal security hierarchy of Azerbaijan before becoming the leader of 
the Aberbaijan Party. He earned a reputation as a tough cop and strict 
disciplinarian. At the December 1983 Plenum of the Communist Party Central 
Committee,, Vital Verotnikov ( 5 7 )  and Mikhail Solomentsev (70) were promoted 
'to full membership in the Politburo. Viktor M. Chebrikov (60) was made a 
candidate member. Yegor Ligachev (63) was elevated to the Secretariat. All 
were seen as Andropov loyalists, strengthening his position at a time when he 
was still absent from public view due to ill health. 
In other major moves, Andrei Gromyko was made First Deputy Premier along 
with his other positions of Foreign Minister and in the Party. Vitaly 
Fedorchuk has moved from KGB Chairman to Minister of Internal Affairs. This 
move places him in charge of all police and security forces, includinq the 
MVD. His replacement as KGB Chairman is former KGB deputy chief Viktor 
~hebrikov.   here have been a number of other important shifts at the'central 
Committee, ministerial, and subministerials level. 
On the surface at least, Andropov has moved more quickly to assert his 
power than any of his predecessors. He makes few public gestures to the 
concept of collective leadership. Andropov's most prominent competitors, 
while still in their positions, are gradually assuming lower visibility. 
Konstantin Chernenko, who was considered Andropov's primary riv'al for 
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succession and in the view of many experts -- Brezhnev's choice -- seems in a 
weakened position. 
The people who assumed greater prominence with the rise of Andropov and 
who are widely seen as having played crucial roles in his succession are 
Defens.e Minister Ustinov, Foreign Minister Gromyko, Gorbachov, Grishin, 
Aliyev, and now Romanov. In recent months, the military has played a highly 
visible role as was most dramatically demonstrated in the KAL incident. The 
very fact that the former KGB Chairman received the backing of the military 
and foreign policy establishments seems to mark a .  significant break with 
Soviet tracition. The KGB and armed forces in particular have always been 
viewed as rivals. 
The conventional wisdom prior to Andropov's rise had been that no KGB head 
could become Soviet leader. The reason for the shift is a matter of 
speculation. Andropov may still be seen primarily as the Party man in 
control of the KGB. It may be that the shared interests of the "national 
security communityw predominated in this transition over their mutual 
suspicions. This may reflect, on the one hand, how seriously the Soviet 
establishment assesses the problems the country faces or, on the other hand, 
how securely in place the Soviet elite is if it no longer feels threatened by 
a KGE leader. 
Despite his early success in moving to consolidate power, his health and 
events could still Conspire to make Andropov a transitional leader. 
He has been out of the public eye for months at a time. Past successions 
indicate that it usually takes several years for a Soviet leader to firmly 
establish his legitimacy. 
COMPETING PRESSURES ON THE NEW LEADERSHIP 
Puriy Andropov and his collegues face a number of competing pressures. 
Their choices range from maintaining the status quo to fundamentally changing 
the system. Change could be in the direction of a return to tight central 
controls and repression, and a dangerous alSeit conservative foreign policy. 
Or it could lead to far reaching reforms that could bring a more 
decentralized, pluralist system increasingly interdependent with and 
therefore more committed to staaility in the world. 
Pressures for Change 
(1) If Andropov's selection amounted to a decision by the leadership that 
the Status quo would no longer do, then new initiatives will be expected of 
him. Andropov can best secure his position by registering early policy 
successes and showing strong leadership in contrast to the stagnation at the 
end of the Brezhnev. era. Andropov's dilemma may be that change is needed to 
secure and hold power, while the same change may stimultate opposition and 
erode support. Above all, he needs success to secure power. 
(2) If Andropov wants to carve his niche in Soviet history, he may not 
have the luxury of movi.ng at a very CaUtiouS pace. He is not only the oldest 
man to assume the Soviet leadership ( 6 9 )  but has experienced serious health 
problems wlth his heart and kidneys over the past several years. 
(3) The most compelling pressure for change will be the urgency of the 
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tasks that Andropov faces. The old methods did not provide solutions to the 
Soviet Union's chronic and growing economic, social, and demographic 
problems. Soviet leaders have acknowledged the seriousness of the problem 
for a number of years. But Brezhnev put off actions to address these 
problems. 
Change under Andropov could take different directions and it cannot be 
assumed that new Soviet policies would necessarily be more favorable to U.S. 
interests. Andropov could give priority to the task of internal 
modernization and accept a degree of social and economic reform. If the new 
leaders committed themselves to raising the living standards of their 
citizens and bridging the economic gap with the West, such a retargeting of 
goals might mean a necessary shift of resources from the military to the 
civilian sector. This in turn could require tempering some of the more 
competitive, ambitious, and costly features of Soviet global policy. It 
could bring an adjustment of policy to allow for. expanded cooperation with 
the West and might result in a stronger Soviet commitment to international 
political and economic stability,' 
The new leaders could also bring changes far less compatible with U.S. 
interests. As the inheritors of massive military power, they could embark on 
a more repressive internal course and a mos2e aggressively ambitious global 
policy. The need to divert attention from domestic problems could tempt them 
to seek dramatic successes in the international arena. A new ideological or 
nationalist ferver could create a heightened threat of confrontation with the 
West. 
Constraints Against Change 
(1) A sizeable and increasingly powerful elite in the Soviet Union has a 
stake in the status quo. They have prospered despite the inefficiencies of 
the Soviet system. Notwithstanding their Support for change in principle, 
they are likely to resist any radical policy shifts which might threaten 
their status. Thus, major policy changes could jeopardize Andropov's 
position at a time when he does not yet have a firm grip on power. 
( 2 )  Any significant change is likely to entail some major reallocation of 
resources. It will be very difficult for any Soviet leader to embark on 
policies that will take away resources and thereby alienate powerful special 
interest groups such as the military. 
(3) Even with the support of the Party hierarchy it will be difficult for 
Andropov to move the massive and unwieldy Soviet bureaucracy in new 
directions. 
ANDROPOV'S POLICIES 
. Andropov's succession has already brought marked changes in style. 1n 
substance, change is less apparant. Some new policies actually were 
introduced in 1982 when Brezhnev was formally still in office, but when the 
balance of power may already have shifted to the group that brought Andropov 
to the top. During his initial months as Party leader, Andropov seems to 
have devoted his major energies to consolidating- his power. But he has 
fueled expectations for further change with his calls to replace slogans by 
action. The Andropov approach to domestic policy thus far has stressed the. 




The first thrust of Andropov's policy has been a major campaign against 
corruption. The war on corruption was declared whiie Brezhnev was still in 
power, but at that time the leadership took only token action against high 
level officials while handing out and publicizing stiff sentences to petty 
criminals. Andropov in his first months in office has moved with 
determination against officials accused of bribe-taking and other crimes. 
The press has been full of accounts of severe punishment, including the death 
penalty, being meted out for economic crimes. it remains to be seen how far 
Andropov will go to combat the problem. The campaign could become 
threatening to much of the elite because so many officials are tainted by the 
corruption pervading the Soviet system. What's more, Andropov's drive might 
be seen as an old-fashioned purge of the old guard under the guise of 
fighting "the rot in society." But his campaign may be popular with the 
average citizen who feels victimized by all-pervasive corruption. 
Andropov has also moved to curtail the abuse of special privileges in 
Soviet society. The structure of perks anti privileges enjoyed by the elite 
includes special subsidized shops-where goods of highest quality can be 
obtained, separate housing, vacation resorts, chauffeured cars, etc. The 
media has launched a campaign denouncing the chronic and flagrant abuses of 
privilege. Andropov is unlikely to eliminate the system of perks which have 
become the primary rewards and compensation for high level service. At the 
least his moves are likely to caution Soviet officials against flaunting 
their special perks in ways which must be very grating to the average 
citizen, whose most common complaint is the scarcity of quality consumer 
goods. 
Andropov's rise to power has coincided with a tightening of political and 
ideological controls throughout the Soviet Union. Strong steps have been 
taken to limit influences from the West, both political and cultural. Direct 
dial phone service to foreign countries has been ended. . Contacts between 
Soviet citizens and Westerners have been made more difficult. Emigration 
from the Soviet Union has been brought to a virtual halt. The scope for 
artistic freedom has been narrowed. The Soviet media has been brought into 
tighter conformity with official policy. The few Soviet dissidents who still 
remain free, including Roy Medvedev, have been put on warning to stop their 
activities or face imprisonment. 
On the other side of the ledger, Andropov has attacked blind and rigid 
adherence to past Communist doctrine. He has urged officials to adopt a more 
flexible approach that takes changing circumstances into account. There have 
been steps to make the bureaucracy more responsive to the people. in a real 
departure from traditional Soviet practice, the media has begun to provide 
very limited coverage of the proceedings of Politburo and other top level 
meetings. Also, the government has encouraged and publicized complaints from 
citizens over government shortcomings. In some instances corrective action 
has been taken. Steps have also been taken to make the press, radio, and 
television more interesting and informative. This has not implied a 
relaxation of censorship or controls over the media. But 3ournaiists have 
been encouraged to provide more sophisticated news and commentary. 
The Soviet Union faces other social problems which do not lend themselves 
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to correction merely through greater discipline and tighter political 
controls. One such problem is the serious decline in the health of the 
Soviet population. This decline, which is unprecedented in an industrialized. 
country, is reflected in a number of statistics. Life expectancy has gone 
down dramatically. Infant mortality has been on the rise. The reasons for 
this trend are not known, though a steady rise in alcoholism is one of the 
suspected causes. A decrease in the allocation of resources to health 
services could be another cause. Finally, lax environmental standards could 
be another contributing factor. 
Andropov faces a serious long-term challenge of a very different nature. 
As a result of demographic trends, Russians will soon constitute a minority 
of the Soviet population. Soviet Central Asians meanwhile are growing at the 
fastest rate. This trend creates political, economic, and security problems. 
In the economic sphere, dislocations are being caused by the fact that the 
new Asian labor pool is far from the industrial regions in need of new 
manpower. Also, the Central Asians are committed to their Islamic and 
agrarian traditions. Corrective measures that would relocate either the 
population or the industries are Virtually impossible to implement because of 
ethnic sensitivities. Meanwhile, government policies aimed at assimilating 
non-Russian ethnic groups have met with stiff resistance at a time of 
resurgent ethnic nationalism, particularly in the Baltic, Caucasian, and 
Central Asian republics. 
Soviet nationality problems are most sensitive in the military. 
Non-Russians now make up a majority of enlisted men. Soviet leaders probably 
are concerned over the more questionable loyalty and effectiveness of these 
forces, as demonstrated by their experience in Afghanistan. 
Economic Policy 
Andropov has been candid in acknowledging and outlining the serio'usness of 
the economic problems faced by the Soviet Union. His speech at the June 1983 
Central Committee Plenum was a particularly harsh attack on the recent Soviet 
record of economic performance. In general he has continued policies started 
by Brezhnev but never fully implemented. These include adjustments in 
investment priorities from a major emphasis on improving food production to 
intensified efforts to reduce wasteful use of energy, labor, and other 
resources. Andropov has also emphasized the need for a better system of 
rewards and incentives for good work and penalties for poor performance. He 
has promised greater attention'to consumer goods production. The Soviet 
leadership used the December 1983 party Plenum and supreme Soviet meeting to 
endorse Andropov's economic policies. Those policies included the 
introduction of modest economic "experimentw in January 1984, involving a 
degree of decentralization and financial incentives. 
Discipline has also been at the heart of Andropov's 'most publicized 
economic moves. In response to problems of low labor productivity, he is 
preaching harder work and introducing measures to enforce it. This campaign 
is no new theme for Soviet leaders either. But Andropov seems to be pushing 
it more forcefully. He has warned of punitive actions against workers guilty 
of shoddy work, absenteeism, drunkenness on the job, etc. To dramatize the 
warnings, the media has publicized. police raids on movie theaters, and other 
public places during working hours to round up absentee workers. But Soviet 
officials have also moved to eliminate some of the outside causes for 
absenteeism. They have extended store hours so that workers are not 
compelled to stand in long lines during work time. They have also promised 
to correct management shortcomings. 
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These measures may have a marginal impact but will not get to the root of 
Soviet economic problems. Therefore many Western experts feel that Andropov, 
if he is to make a real difference, will have to consider more far-reaching 
changes. 
The most sensitive choices are those between "guns" and "butter.If   he 
question of reallocating resources between the military and civilian sectors 
has not been raised publicly. Andropov may not have either the power or the 
inclination to tamper with the basic balance, which has favored the military. 
If he were to undertake any. shifts in this area, it would be the strongest 
possible indication that Soviet policy was taking a new direction. 
Andropov has not launched or endorsed any major economic reform either, 
but there has.been a growing debate in the Soviet Union on the question. 
Both the Hungarian and East German economlc models have received serious 
attention from Soviet economists. Hungarian agricultural successes in 
particular have stirred Soviet interest. The attraction of the East German 
model is that it has achieved impressive economic results without retreating 
from central planning. Ultima'tely, the Soviet leaders are unlikely to adopt 
either the Hungarian or the East German models because neither experiences 
are transferable to the Soviet Union, given the size of its economy and 
complexity of its problems. Eut they could adopt elements of either with 
very different political and social consequences for the Soviet Union. 1n 
the economic realm, more than any other, Andropov will be under pressure to 
register successes. This fact may still push him toward some fundamental 
changes. 
Security and Foreign Policy 
Overview 
Andropov's foreign policy approach has also offered a new style with only 
hints of possible changes in substance. Foreign policy is continuing to 
receive a high priority under Andropov, as suggested by the elevation of 
Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to First Deputy Premier. Andropov's foreign 
policy initiatives have been coupled with an aggressive propaganda campaign 
aimed at various foreign audiences. Andropov has sought even more 
aggressively than Brezhnev to use foreign public opinion to influence 
governments. From gimmicks such as published responses to letters from 
children abroad to very blatant threats and enticements, he has taken his 
message directly to the foreign electorates. 
Under Brezhnev, the Soviet Union achieved major successes in foreign 
policy. Nevertheless, it faces mounting international problems. Soviet 
leaders may wonder if they are overextended given their difficulty in coping 
with problems on their periphery (Poland and Afghanistan), the increased cost 
of maintaining an empire and the questionable return on their investments in 
more distant regions. They have also witnessed a decline in the appeal of 
the Soviet Union as a developmental or social model. , 
Andropov is likely to consider the option of selective retrenchment. This 
is not to suggest that the Soviet Union would retreat from its position as 'a 
global power. Moscow might, however, reassess individual commitments in 
terms of =heir costs and benefits, e-g., Afghanistan, the PRC, and Southern 
Africa. 
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He may also reconsider the balance of emphasis between the different 
i'nstruments in the Soviet foreign policy arsenal. Like the United States, 
the Soviet Union has both a military and economic aid program, although the 
economic Component is smaller than that of the United States. 
The most successful Soviet aid efforts have been in the military and 
security fields, often to governments facing a military challenge from home 
or abroad. In addition to military sales and credits, this assistance has 
included advisors and technicians, extensive training programs for foreign 
technicians, and in some cases troops (mostly Cuban). Together with its 
allies, the Soviet Union has been able to offer fragile foreign governments 
regime security and the tools for maintaining control. Their aid package has 
included building up the armed forces, building and running internal security 
and secret police operations for client states, and establishment of sta'te 
controlled press and media. Such aid has been provided to Angola, Ethiopia, 
South Yemen, Libya, and Syria. This area is not without dilemmas for the 
Soviets and the recipient governments, as resupply of Syria illustrates: 
advanced weaponry with Soviet technicians and advisor's increases the risk of 
Soviet direct involvement and reduces their flexibility, even as it increases 
the foreign government's dependence on Moscow. 
Andropov is likely to continue and possib,ly try to expand this aid program 
when targets of opportunity present themselves, as in Central America. The 
cost is not necessarily higher than traditional aid programs and it creates a 
continuing reliance on Moscow and therefore a continuing role for the Soviet 
Union. 
In contrast, Soviet economic aid programs have been less cost-effective. 
Often their tangible benefits to the recipient country or to the Soviet Union 
have been modest. They have not necessarily brought an'y lasting bonds of 
friendship or loyalty. Even countries which rely heavily on the Soviet Union 
for security assistance (such as Angola) are looking increasingly to the West 
for help in developing their economies. If Andropov were to make cutbacks, 
they would be more likely to come in this type of aid. 
Reordering Priorities 
Under Brezhnev, the Soviet Union was generally cautious in its foreign 
policy, even though Moscow made significant advances in some Third World 
countries aft2r 1976. Moscow was quick to take advantage of low-risk 
opportunities for expanding Soviet influence. Wfiere Soviet security 
interests were directly at stake, as in Poland and Afghanistan, they were 
willing to take higher. risks to protect their interests. Andropov is likely 
to continue this policy of seeking out targets of opportunity. So far he has 
shown no signs of being less cautious than Brezhnev or more willing to gamble 
outside areas of vital interest to the Soviets. 
Andropov may be forced to rethink Soviet priorities. Relations with the 
United States, Which have reached a new low in the aftermath of the Soviet 
shooting down of a Korean airliner, remain at the center of Soviet foreign 
policy. Ultimately, Andropov's success or failure in dealing with the United 
States will be the most important yardstick by which his overall performance 
is measured. Therefore, these relations will continue to occupy the highest 
priority. 
From a strategic viewpoint, Eastern European and other countries in the 
security zone along the Soviet border have been and Wili remain the most 
important region for Soviet foreign poiicy. Because of mounting social and 
economic problems in Poland, Afghanistan, and other countries of the region, 
and the continuing rivalry with China, Andropov may have to devote 
considerable attention there. He initially made a strong push to improve 
relations with China, but the impact on relations has been modest. 
Western Europe has traditionally been a region of great significance for 
the Soviet Union. But it has not been particularly fertile grounds for 
Soviet gains. Now, because of U.S-West European differences and growing 
disarmament sentiment, Soviet calcuiations may be changing. Andropov's most 
vigorous campaign has been aimed at Western Europe on the intermediate 
nuclear weapons (INF) issue. He has escalated Brezhnev's peace offensive 
into an all-out push to halt the deployment of U.S. intermediate range 
nuclear weapons. 
East-West Relations and INF 
Andropov's foreign policy has focused heavily on Western Europe in his 
first year. Following in Brezhnev's footsteps, but with even greater energy, 
Andropov has pursued four apparent objectives: 
(1) To block the NATO deployment of INF. The Soviets kept up an 
intensive public campaign to get a unilateral reversal of NATO's 1979 
decision taken (in response to Soviet SS-20 deployments) to deploy Pershings 
and cruise missiles. Since they have not been able to block INF deployments, 
their objective might be to make it as costly as possible in terms of future 
Western unity. 
( 2 )  They have sought to portray themselves as genuinely interested in 
neogtiating arms control agreements. A series of proposals, though 
unacceptable to the West, were designed to show flexibility by Moscow at 
START, INF, MBFR, and CSCE talks. With the U.S. missile deployments in 
December 1983, the Soviets have walked out of all but the Stockholm 
negotiations. 
( 3 )  To drive a wedge between the U.S. and its allies. As a result of 
Western policy differences, the Soviets have seen a real opportunity for 
gains in Western Europe at the expense of the United States. They have tried 
to turn Western differences over arms control, East-West relations, and trade 
to their own advantage. They were probably encouraged by the fact that 
events such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the crackdown in 
Poland, while carrying some price in strengthening Western unity to a degree, 
also had the counterbalancing effect of excarbating NATO differences as 
Western governments could not agree on the proper response. At the same 
time, Andropov sought to preserve the benefits of the Soviet detente 
relationship with Western Europe, despite the erosion of Moscow-Washington 
relations. 
(4) To bring West European pressure to bear for the purpose of restoring 
U.S.-Soviet detente ane redirecting U.S. policies in ways more advantageous 
for Moscow. The Soviets'have hoped that West European governments would use 
their leverage with Washington to get the U.S. administration to be more 
conciliatory toward the Soviet Union. 
The Andropov leadership has pursued its "peace offensive" in Europe with 
great intensity. Some observers now feel chat the Soviets have overplayed 
their hand, and may have actually contributed zo Western unity and resolve on 
the INF issue and beyond.' 
Problems on the Soviet Periphery 
Poland and Eastern Europe 
Andropov's most serious challenge is presented by the continuing crisis in 
Poland and growing strains elsewhere in Eastern Europe. These countries all 
face serious economic difficulties, necessitating tight austerity measures 
and creating prospects of stagnating or even declining living standards. 
These trends combined with existing social and political tensions could 
translate into growing popular unrest in a number of countries. In the face 
of these trends, the Soviets can move in one or more of the following 
directions: 
(1) They could sharply increase their subsidy of East European economies 
by providing more energy and raw materials at cheap prices. This could take 
some of the political pressure off East European governments. But economic 
subsidies are becoming a less realistic option as the Soviet demand for 
resources grows, while resources become scarcer, and can be sold elsewhere 
for much needed hard currency. 
(2) They could loosen their grip on Eastern Europe and allow greater 
autonomy for internal reform and diversified trade patterns. Such a move 
might help improve conditions in individual countries. At the least, it 
would reduce Soviet responsibility for conditions in those countries but at 
the expense of reduced Soviet influence. 
(3) They could try to tighten controls (political and military) over the 
East European countries in order to contain potential unrest that might 
result from deteriorating economic conditions. This would involve pressure 
on East European governments to conform more rigidly to Soviet policies and 
the threat or ultimately the use of Soviet power to ensure stability. 
Until now, there is no clear indication as to which of these options 
Andropov will favor. In the Polish case, there has been no hint of new 
assistance or increased subsidies and there have been pressures on the 
Jaruzelski regime to impose greater discipline. Recent articles in the 
Soviet media have been sharply critical of "liberals" in the Polish 
leadership, as well as alleged government leniency. Other press commentaries 
have criticized Romania's independent foreign policy. Both countries were 
unusually quick to reject Soviet criticism. It is not known whether these 
articles represent prevailing Soviet leadership views or whether they 
indicate a policy debate in Moscow. 
On the other side of the ledger, there has been evidence that under 
Andropov economic reforms in Hungary, East Germany, and Bulgaria have been 
legitimized. Andropov's speech at the June 1983 Central Committee Plenum 
admitted to disagreements in the Socialist bloc. These differences have been 
dramatized by the difficulties in convening or reachiqg agreement at the 
COMECON summit meeting. But he also acknowledged the fact that there were 
historical and cultural reasons for differences between the Soviet Union and 
its allies which had to be accepted by Moscow. 
Afghanistan 
Andropov's initial moves on Afghanistan suggested that he might be seeking 
a negotiated settlement. Following the Brezhnev funeral, he met with the 
leaders of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India to discuss the crisis. High 
level Soviet Statements raised Western hopes that the Soviets might indeed be 
looking for a way out of their military involvement there. Several reports 
in.the Western press even claimed that Andropov had been one of the 
dissenting voices when the Soviets made the decision to invade that country. 
Further clarifications of Andropov's position on Afghanistan showed that 
his formal terms for getting out were the same as Brezhnev's. 1n MOSCOW'S 
view, any solution essentially would have to preserve the status quo imposed 
on the country by the Soviet intervention in 1979. Despite this impasse, 
efforts continue 'to find a diplomatic solution. A United Nations initiative 
to end the war has been viewed positively by Soviet spokesmen. Chances for 
progress in these negotiations were seen as heightened by Pakistan's growing 
interest. 
.Meanwhile, the fighting in Afghanistan continues to be costly for the 
Soviets. Besides the direct costs of sustaining the war, they have had to 
face the consequences of increased isolation in the Third World. But to 
date, the evidence suggests that Andropov, as his predecessor, views the 
Afghanistan venture as being worth the cost, given Soviet security interests. 
China 
Before his death, Brezhnev made a serious bid to improve Sino-Soviet 
relations. This effort has been continued by Andropov. He met with the 
Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua on the occasion of Brezhnev's funeral. 
The Chinese foreign minister stayed on in Moscow for extensive talks with 
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. 
The Sino-Soviet dialogue continues. There have also been modest 
improvements in trade and cultural relations. Apparently neither country 
sees its interests as being served by continued bilateral tensions. This 
more businesslike relationship is already affecting U.S. interests. China 
can no longer automatically be counted as an ally in disputes with Moscow. 
Yet Andropov is unlikely to achieve a major rapprochement with China in 
the forseeable future. Too many Soviet and PRC interests and goals are in 
conflict. Differences on Vietnam and Southeast Asia, Afghanistan, and in the 
boundary dispute seem almost irreconcilable. He may be playing his ItChina 
cardm in relations with the United States and Japan. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 
So far, Andropovts rise to power has coincided with a deterioration in the 
state of U.S.-Soviet relations. Frictions between the two countries once 
high, particularly since the KAL incident and the rupture of START, INF, and 
MBFR negotiations. Moscow continues to express deep concern over the U.S. 
defense build-up and has warned of Soviet countermeasures. The United States 
in turn has been angered Sy perceived Soviet intransigence on issues dividing 
the two countries. Thus far, Soviet leader Andropov has offered little on 
the main points of friction to ease tensions. If anything, he has raised the 
voiume of anti-American rhetoric in response to harsh words from the Reagan 
Administration. The superpower dialogue continues on Only at the Stockholm 
Conf.erence on Confidence Building Measures and Disarmanent in Europe (CDE) 
which opened in January 1984. 
Yet Andropov may want and need improved relations with the United States 
under the right conditions. The Soviet Union might see .great benefits in a 
return to the U.S.-Soviet detente of the early 1970s, particularly if it 
included a lessened U.S. commitment to the defense buildup, resumption of 
extensive trade and economic cooperation, and a greater U.S. tolerance for an 
active Soviet role in dealing with various global and regional issues. . 
Andropov's image and position in the Soviet Union would be strengthened if he 
could bring about a return to detente and get more positive treatment from 
the Uiiited States. Before the recent downturn in relations there have been 
numerous private comments and public signals of a desire to negotiate. 
The question to which there is not yet an answer is what price Andropov 
would be willing to pay for improved U.S.-Soviet relations. Many Western 
analysts believe that the Soviets understand that they would have to make 
concessions to normalize relations. Because relations with the U.S. are so 
central to Moscow's interests, they believe that Andropov might be willing 
pay a fairly high price. Some would go so far to say that the incentive of 
improved U.S.-Soviet relations could move the Soviets to reverse their policy 
on issues of concern to the United States, such as Afghanistan and Poland. 
In fact there is an argument sometimes voiced by Soviets that if U.S.- Soviet 
relations had been on a normal track there would not have been a Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan and the evolution in Poland might have been different 
or that the Soviets would have been less likely to shoot down the Korean 
airliner. As it was, according to this claim, the Soviets had nothing to 
lose in terms of the already ruptured U.S.-Soviet relationship, according to 
this view. 
There may, however, be serious limits to the concessions Andropov would 
make for the sake of improved U.S. ties. The success of his policy toward 
the United States will not be measured by his colleagues only in terms of the 
warmth of relations. It is equally important that he not show weakness 'in 
his dealings with Washington. Therefore he is likely to drive a hard bargain 
in any negotiation. This need to look strong on Andropov's part will be a 
definite constraint against rapid improvement in U.S.-Soviet ties. 
Those who hold out little hope for improved U.S.-Soviet relations under 
Andropov feel that these constraints will predominate. They argue that he 
will earn more points by standing up to the United States than by making 
concessions to restore closer ties. 
Many observers, nevertheless, see this as a moment of opportunity in 
U.S.-Soviet relations. They believe that Soviet policies are more 
susceptible to change during this fluid period than once a new direction is 
set. 
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